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I. INTRODUCTION

In the United States, which has the western world's leading
divorce rate,' children increasingly are being raised in non2
traditional families. Many children will spend some time living in
a stepfamily.3 Often a non-parent is the only father or mother a
child has known-the "one who, on a day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, [has
fulfilled] the child's psychological need for a parent. " 4 That person
is essential to a child's development and well being, often more so
than a biological or adoptive parent, and the emotional bonds
children form with these "non-parents" can be as strong and
meaningful as the bonds between parents and their children.
1. "In 1990, the U.S. had the highest divorce rate among advanced Western
nations; 6 out of 10 of those divorces took place in families with children." See
Beth Bailey, Broken Bonds: The Effects of Divorce on Society, Family, and Children, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 9, 1997, at 6.
2. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 1-2 (1994). The
nuclear family no longer is the dominant family model; it is now estimated that
only 21% of households in America are traditional nuclear families. See id.
3. See Bryce Levine, Divorce and the Modern Family: ProvidingIn Loco Parentis
Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a DissolutionProceeding
25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 315, 316 (1996) (providing demographers' prediction that
one in three American children will spend some of their time growing up in a
stepfamily); Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 Sw.
U. L. REV. 399, 400 (1997) (stating that one out of every three children will spend
some time living in a stepfamily); Virginia Rutter, Lessonsfrom Stepfamilies, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, May-June 1994, at 30.
4.

JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,

BEYOND THE BEST

INTERESTS

OF THE CHILD

98

(1973); see also Mangnall, supra note 3, at 417-19 (discussing the need for courts to
recognize the importance of psychological parenting). A child's perception of a
parent is shaped by his or her day-to-day needs. SeeJames B. Boskey, The Swamps of
Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-ChildRelationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 805, 808
(1995).
5.

See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4 (suggesting resolving custody disputes

by recognizing the importance of this sort of psychological parent, rather than
focusing on the biological aspects of parenting); see also LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN, § 2.08, at 52-53 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing the
psychological parent doctrine).
6. See Arlene B. Huber, Children at Risk in the Politics of Child Custody Suits:
Acknowledging their Needs for Nurture, 32 U. LOUIsviLLEJ. FAM. L. 33, 34 (1993-94).
"[T]erminating custodial relationships between stepparents and stepchildren
simply because the marriage ends is unfair to stepparents who assumed a parental
role during marriage and can be detrimental to children, especially if they view
their stepparents as 'psychological parents'." Mangnall, supra note 3, at 403; see
also Susan H. v.Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
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Unfortunately, however, third parties who have become
'psychological parents"' and seek custody are faced with an
obstacle not faced by biological or adoptive parents: the "superior
rights" doctrine, 9 a presumption in most states that unless parents
are at least in some broad sense unfit, they are the best persons to
raise and nurture their children.'0 For example, one of the model
provisions in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),"
promulgated almost thirty years ago, contains a "standing"
requirement calculated to give third parties a right to petition for
custody only under the narrowest of circumstances.12 This
the relationship between a child and the man she knows as her father does not
necessarily terminate upon divorce from the child's mother).
7. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 98; see also James G. O'Keefe, The
Need to Consider Children'sRights in BiologicalParents v. Third Paty Custody Disputes,
67 CHI. KENT L. REv. 1077, 1081 (1991) (describing a child's emotional
attachment to third parties).
8. Stepparents are not afforded the same rights in child custody suits as
parents, because in the eyes of the law, stepparents are seen as legal strangers to
their former stepchildren. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the NuclearFamily
has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 894 (1984); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
"Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8
BYUJJ. PUB. L. 321, 335 (1994) (arguing that when two adults have raised a child
together in the context of a nuclear family setting, there should be no significance
attached to the nonexistence of a biological or legal connection between the child
and one of the parents).
9. See, e.g., Matter of Appeal in Cochise Cty. Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650
P.2d 459, 460 (Ariz. 1982); In re Newsome, 527 N.E.2d 524, 525 (Ill. 1988);
Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Ky. App. 1986).
10. Not all states refer to a "presumption" or a "superior right." In some
states, the doctrine is said to imply a "natural right." See, e.g., Paul v. Peniston, 105
S.2d 228, 232 (La. 1958) (Tate, J., concurring). In others, it is a "prima facie
right." See, e.g., In re Hernandez, 376 A.2d 648, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
California law, by contrast, requires a preference, rather than a presumption, that
biological or adoptive parents should prevail over non-parents, and sets forth the
order of preference in child custody matters. See CAL FAM. CODE § 3040(a) (West
1994 & Supp. 2000). This is known as the "doctrine of parental preference." See
In re Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Cal. 1974). The majority of courts give such
'preferences" to biological and adoptive parents. See, e.g., J.E.C., Jr. v. J.E.C., Sr.,
575 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); In re Maricopa City Juvenile Action No.
JD-4974, 785 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Etheredge v. Yawn, 605 So. 2d
761, 764 (Miss. 1992); In re Feemster, 751 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
Uhing v. Uhing, 488 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Neb. 1992); Abaire v. Himmelberger, 558
N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re Sedelmeier, 491 N.W.2d 86, 87 (S.D.
1992); Pribbenow v. Van Sambeek, 418 N.W.2d 626, 628 (S.D. 1988); Brown v.
Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
11. §§ 101-309, 9A U.L.A. 159 (1988 & Supp. 1999); §§ 310-506, 9A U.L.A. 1
(1998 & Supp. 1999).
12. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 401(d) (2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1998).
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provision, with some subsequent modifications or repeals in several
states, 3 was incorporated into the law of several states. 4 Typically,
legislation to preserve the "superior rights" doctrine:
[was] devised to protect the "parental rights" of custodial
parents and to insure that intrusions upon those rights
will occur only when the care the parent is providing the
child falls short of the minimum standard imposed by the
community at large-the standard incorporated in the
neglect or delinquency definitions of the state's Juvenile
Court Act.15

13. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.09.180 (West 1986) (repealed by 1987
Wash. Laws ch. 460, § 61). But see WASH. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2000), which augments the third party standing language found in the
UMDA as follows: "[O]nly if the child is not in the physical custody of one of its
parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian." Id.
14. In 1977, for example, Illinois adopted Section 601(b) (2) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601 (West
1999). Section 601 was "based largely on [Section 401 of the] Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws." Illinois House Debates, June 23,1998, p. 142 (3d Reading)
(comments of Rep. Jaffe). It sets forth the circumstances under which a circuit
court possesses the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to make a "child custody
determination by initial or modification judgment ....
750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 35/4 (West 1999). Jurisdiction exists over the child if Illinois is the home
state of the child at the time of the dissolution proceedings. See 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 35/4 (a) (1) (i) (West 1992); see also Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking up a
Family or Putting it Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in
Third Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1045, 1069 n.102 (1996) (listing
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and
Washington as adopting states). The author includes Minnesota in her list of
adopting states, but that inclusion appears to be an error.
15. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND D1vORCE Acr, § 401 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 264 (1998).
[Given the] intense emotionalism [of custody adjudication], how "unfit"
litigating parents often appear or are made to appear to judges, and the
invitation the "best interests" standard's indeterminate qualities offers to
judges to award custody to those litigants whose attributes and values
most resemble their own.... an expansion ofjudicial discretion may well
produce a much larger increase in the number of stepparents custody
awards than is warranted by the number of [stepparents who truly
deserve custody]. Denying "standing" to stepparents can be justified,
then, because many of the "truiy" meritorious stepparent claims will in
any event be honored by decisions "outside doctrinal parameters," while
the "formal," "no standing," rule will serve to protect many biological
parents from those trial judges tempted to use indeterminate custody
standards to prefer stepparents inappropriately.
RobertJ. Levy, Rights and Responsibilitiesfor Extended Family Members, 27 FAM. L.Q.
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The problem, however, is that requiring parental "unfitness" as
a condition precedent to placing children with third parties
unnecessarily duplicates the work of the Adoption and Juvenile
Court Acts, may interfere with the court's ability to focus on the
best interests of children,17 and rarely is necessary for the
protection of the legitimate interests of parents. 8 Indeed, the
"superior rights" presumption was directly called into question just
a few years ago in a Pennsylvania case, Rowles v. Rowes.19 The
concurring opinion questioned the legitimacy of recognizing "a
prima facie presumption that parents have a right to custody of
their children as against third parties:" °
[s]erious questions may be posed with respect to the
soundness of the apriorism that mere biological
191, 197-98 (1993) (speculating on why participants in a family law conference
were largely committed to "protecting the interests of the biological parents" and
favoring the "traditional doctrine") (citations omitted).
16. See In re L.A.E., 554 N.W.2d 393, 397, 398 (Minn. 1996). See, e.g., In re
Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 506, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (holding that the
abandonment by a parent must be intentional and not due to circumstances
beyond the control of the parent). For example, "abandonment" is any conduct
that evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child. See id. at 505-06, 178 N.W.2d at 713 (holding that
abandonment requires both actual desertion of the child and "an intention to
forsake the duty of parenthood").
Under Staat the abandonment must be
intentional rather than due to misfortune or misconduct. See id. Consequently,
the petitions of parents who fail to support their children or who relinquish
custody or otherwise forfeit a claim to parenthood may be unable at a later date to
regain custody. See generally Wilson v. Barnet, 275 Minn. 32, 36-37, 144 N.W.2d 700,
703-04 (1966) (holding that a parent who demonstrated unfit behavior did not
have the right to withhold consent from an adoption proceeding); In re
Hohmann, 225 Minn. 165, 168-69, 95 N.W.2d 643, 647 (1959) (holding that if the
custodial parent passed away then the child would automatically return to the noncustodial parent, unless a third party could show a finding of abandonment or
unfitness).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 154 (1963-64) ("Whether as a result of [feeling
inadequate to determine the best interests of children] or because of a sympathy
for parental emotions, most courts applying the best interest test to third party
situations utilize a variety of procedural devices [such as the parental rights
presumption] which increase the probability of the natural parent winning the
suit."). See generally JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW 185-86
(1947) (discussing generally the operation of a
presumption).
19. 668 A.2d 126 (Pa. 1995).
20. Id. at 127 (quoting Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 516 (Pa. 1980)
(Flaherty, J., concurring)).
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relationship assures solicitude, care, devotion, and love for
one's offspring.... [W]here a third party better fulfills
these needs, or where other circumstances indicate third
party custody to be preferable, the courts, when exercising
judgment as to a child's welfare, should not be restrained
solely by a presumption. 1
Thus,• 22the "superior rights" presumption at least is
questionable and may be problematic in that it compels court's to
focus on parental "quasi-property" rights instead of the overall
welfare of children, which often may23 involve maintaining
relationships with one or more non-parents.
This article first discusses the evolution of the parental
"superior rights" doctrine in Minnesota, then attempts to
illuminate the current burden of proof on third parties seeking
custody. The question is whether third parties must meet a "onepart" balancing test (proof that the child's "best interests" lie with
custody in a third party as compared to a parent) or a "two-part"
test (proof of parental "unfitness," then proof of the child's "best
interests"). Finally, an effort is made to reach certain discrete
conclusions about whether interpretation of the "superior rights"
doctrine in Minnesota has furthered or somehow inhibited the
rendering of custody decisions in the "best interests" of children.

21. Id.at 128.
22. "Superior rights" doctrines are sometimes justified today through the
assumption that a natural parent will most adequately fulfill his child's needs. See
In re Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Minn. 1980) (holding that a party may
rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence); In re Klugman, 56
Minn. 113, 118, 97 N.W.2d 425, 429 (1959). There is, however, little scientific
basis for the presumption that a child's best interests are best served by being in
the custody of natural parents. See Richard J. Gelles, Family Reunification/Family
Preservation:Are Children Really Being Protected?, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENcE 557,
560 (1993).
23. After all, critics of Goldstein et al., supra note 4, say the real best interests
of a child may be in retaining relationships, if they exist, with more than one
psychological parent. See generally Peggy C. Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever
Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.

CHANGE

557, 559 (1983-84).

For other

criticisms of the conclusions of Goldstein et al., see Nanette Dembitz, Beyond Any
Discipline's Competence, 83 YALE LJ. 1304 (1973-74); Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B.
Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 996 (1974).
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II. THE "SUPERIOR RIGHTS" PRESUMPTION: HAS PARENTAL
UNFITNESS SUFFICIENT FOR TERMINATION OF RIGHTS OR A FINDING
OF NEGLECT BEEN A NECESSARY PRECURSOR TO THIRD PARTY
CUSTODY IN MINNESOTA?

Most likely, the "superior rights" doctrine evolved from very
early judicial decisions that looked only to parents' proprietary or
possessory interests in children. 4 To some extent, the growing
obsolescence of the concept of children as property led to changes
in judicial attitudes and approaches. 5 Nevertheless, "[e]ven into
the early twentieth century, courts in the United States almost
uniformly held that a father had the right to custody of his children
as a matter of property law or title. "26 Even those state courts that
purport to act in the best interests of children require
"extraordinary
circumstances"-such
as
forfeiture
or
relinquishment of parental rights-to place custody in nonparents. 27 Some states still refuse to do so unless surviving parents
28
can demonstrate sufficient unfitness to terminate parental rights.
Minnesota long has been a state in which "the controlling
question" in custody determinations has been the best interests of
the child,2 even though at the same time the state's courts have
enforced a parental "superior rights" presumption. Even before

24. See, e.g., Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (D. R.I. 1824); Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
26. See Kaas, supra note 14, at 1063 (stating that children historically have
been viewed as the property of their parents); see also Paul Sayre, Awarding Custody
of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672, 674-75 (1942) (explaining the historic
interpretation of custody as a property interest).
27. Prior to 1964, even those states that employed the best interests test in
custody disputes between parents replaced it with the "fitness test" where the
contest was between a parent and a nonparent. See Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris
Jonas Freed, Child Custody (Part1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 425 (1964); see also Sayre,
supra note 26, at 674-75.
28. See, e.g., In reA.R.A., 919 P.2d 388, 391 (Mont. 1996) (stating that a third
party may have standing, but can be awarded custody only after there has been a
finding of abuse, neglect or dependency).
29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Minn. 198, 94 N.W. 681, 682 (1903)
("[T]he essential thing [is] the welfare of the children."); Greenwood v.
Greenwood, 84 Minn. 203, 204, 87 N.W. 489, 489 (1901) ("[T he welfare of the
children will be given controlling consideration by the court."); Flint v. Flint, 63
Minn. 187, 189, 65 N.W. 272, 273 (Minn. 1895) ("[T]he primary object of all
courts, at least in America, is to secure the welfare of the child, and not the special
claims of one or the other parent.").
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passage of the current Minnesota Statutes section 518.156,30 a nonparent in Minnesota could obtain custody of a child under the
Probate Act,3 1 the Juvenile

Court Act,32 or Minnesota Statute

259. 33

Chapter
Obtaining custody under the Probate Act, however,
generally was limited to situations where both parents had died or
lost the capacity to care for the child.3
Moreover, under the
Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act, custody or adoption of
the child could be ordered only upon a showing of parental
unfitness, 5 even if custody in the petitioner was in the child's best
interests.3 6 Natural parents, however, have occasionally been
deprived of the custody of their children "under a variety of
circumstances," usually as a result of habeas corpus proceedings.

30. MINN. STAT. § 518.156 (1998).
31. Id. § 525.591(1998).
32. Id. § 260.111, subd. 2(d) (1980). "Thejuvenile court in those counties in
which the judge of the probate juvenile court has been admitted to the practice of
law in this state shall proceed under the laws relating to adoptions in all adoption
matters." Id.
33. Id. § 259.22 (1998). "Any person who has resided in the state for one
year or more may petition to adopt a child or an adult." Id.
34. See generally Burris v. Hiller, 258 Minn. 491, 104 N.W.2d 851 (1960)
(discussing that if a child who had one parent dies in an automobile accident,
then the other parent should have custody over the child; however, if both parents
die in the accident, then a third party would have custody rights over the child).
35. It has long been the case that parents who have neglected, deserted, or
abandoned their family also may forfeit their rights to custody. See Foster & Freed,
supra note 27, at 432. Family and juvenile court acts in several states have long had
authority to terminate and fix custody in cases of dependent or neglected
children. See Walker A. Jensen, The Child Without a Family: Problems in the Custody
and Adoption of Children, 1962 U. ILL. L. REv. 633, 634.
36. Only occasionally did courts circumvent this "fitness" rule. See In re
N.M.O., 399 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that third party
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, even where the parent is fit); Tubwon v.
Weisberg, 394 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the fitness of
a natural parent will not necessarily compel custody for the parent).
37. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Minn. 198, 200, 94 N.W. 681, 682
(1903) (stating that the right of parents to have custody of their children is
important but not absolute). See also Clifford v. Woodford, 320 P.2d 452 (Ariz.
1957) (holding that a father did not automatically have custody of a child);
Hermann v. Jenkins, 180 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) ("The parents' natural
right must give way to the welfare and best interest of the child."); Clark v.
Chrietzberg, 348 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that the best
interests of the child was more important than the superior rights of the parent).
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III. THE "SUPERIOR RIGHTS" PRESUMPTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR THE PROTECTED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CHILD
CUSTODY AND CONTROL

It should be noted at the outset, that even though the
"superior rights" doctrine 8 occasionally may seem to dictate
custody decisions contrary to the emotional and relational interests
of stepparents and children, the natural parent-child relationship is
a protected fundamental right under the Constitution. 39 A natural
parent's right to raise his or her own child also is protected by the
constitutions of some states.40 Indeed, in a variety of cases, the U.S.
to develop a constitutional
Supreme Court has even undertaken
41
definition of the family itself.
The Court established constitutional protection for the parentchild relationship as early as 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska.42 Meyer
involved a Nebraska statute that forbade teaching any foreign
38. See Matter of Appeal in Cochise Cty. Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d
459, 460 (Ariz. 1982) (stating that a parent has a fundamental right to the custody
and control of his or her minor child); In re Newsome, 527 N.E.2d 524, 525 (I11.
1988) ("The natural parents have the superior right to care, custody and control
of their children."); see also Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1986) ("The natural parents of a child have a superior right to its care and
custody.").
39. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
40. See, e.g., In re Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(examining the fundamental right of child rearing with regard to a grandparent
visitation statute), rev'd, 594 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 1999) (reversing the court of
appeals decision because the trial court had abused its discretion in granting
grandparents visitation rights and the appellate court had upheld the award).
41. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977)
(holding that the state could not apply a single family zoning statute to a family
consisting of a grandparent and two of her grandchildren who were cousins; the
protection accorded the traditional parent-child relationship was based upon a
flexible definition of family). In holding that the definition of family is to be
interpreted flexibly, the Moore court stated that " [o]urs is by no means a tradition
limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family." Id. at
504. But see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (reaffirming a flexible definition of family based not
necessarily on blood, marriage or adoption, yet refusing to extend constitutional
protection to a foster family protesting New York's laws allowing removal of foster
children from foster families).
42. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) ("[C]ustody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder."); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The
ConstitutionalRight of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals,
53 MD. L. REv. 358, 363 (1994); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional
Status and Meaningof ParentalRights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 975 (1988).
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language to a child prior to eighth grade.43 The Court held the
statute unconstitutional, finding that the statute infringed on the
liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual... to
marry, establish a home and bring up children.., it is the natural
duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their
situation in life.""
Subsequently, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters 5 the Court was
confronted with a state statute that prohibited children from
attending non-public schools. 46 The Court held that the law
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.
Meyer and Pierce established that parents'
authority to rear their children as they see fit is constitutionally
protected. 48 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,49 the
Court reaffirmed this principle by holding that a statute requiring
children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance over parental objection
violated rights of free expression and religious freedom under the
43.

See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397. The court noted that the statute stated in part:

No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any
person in any language other than the English language.... Languages,
other than the English language, may be taught... only after... eighth
grade... any person who violates any of the provisions of this act ...
shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five ($25) dollars.
Id.
44. Id. at 399-400.
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46. See id. at 530 (stating that the Compulsory Education Act required every
parent or guardian having custody of a child between eight and 16 to send the
child "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held
during the current year").
47. Id. at 534-35. The Court went on to say: "The child is not the mere
creature of the state" and parents who nurture the child can "direct his destiny...
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Id. at 535.
48. See Linda L. Lane, The ParentalRights Movement, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 825,
838 (1998). The author mentions that Meyer and Pierce recognize a parent's right
to control his child's upbringing as a "fundamental substantive right protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment." See id. The author goes on to say that critics caution
that the cases can promote the "view of the child as the parent's private property"
to the detriment of the child and legitimate state authority. See id.
49. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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First and Fourteenth Amendments. 50
Notwithstanding the fundamental right articulated in Meyer,
Pierce and Barnette, in Prince v. MassachusettP the Court declared

that although a parent had a constitutionally protected right to
direct the upbringing of her child, this right could be outweighed
by a state's compelling interest in the child's health and well
being.52 The Massachusetts statute in Prince, indirectly prohibiting
children proselytizing on public streets by restricting the times and
circumstances under which children could remain on those streets,
was upheld because, as part of its parens patriaepower, the state had
a compelling interest in enacting child labor laws to protect
children. s
In Stanley v. Illinois,5 the Court for the first time addressed the
rights of unwed fathers in a case where an Illinois statute presumed
those fathers unfit.55 The Court declared that unwed fathers have a
fundamental right to a parent-child relationship and that under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unwed fathers
cannot be deprived of parental rights without a hearing to

50. Id. at 642. The Court further stated that "no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id.
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), Amish parents
argued that a law, which mandated attendance at school until the age of 16, was
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The Supreme Court held this
statute unconstitutional because it would contravene parents' child-rearing
authority and free exercise of religion, both protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 233-34.
51. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
52. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-170 ("[N]either rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation."). A state as parens patriae "may restrict the
parent's control by requiring school attendance" or regulating, indeed,
prohibiting the child's labor. Id. at 166. Parental authority may be balanced
against a state's police power when necessary to protect children and promote
their welfare. See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to
Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205, 218-23 (1972).
53. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 169. Massachusetts's Child Labor Law prohibited a
boy under 12 and a girl under 18 from selling, exposing, or offering for sale "any
newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise ... in any
street or public place." Id. at 160-61.
54. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
55. See id. at 647. The statute in Stanley failed to include unwed fathers as
"parents" the statute only included "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or
the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes
any adoptive parent." Id. at 649-50. Accordingly, when the natural mother died,
Stanley had no parental rights, he was presumed unfit, and his children became
wards of the state and were placed with a public guardian. See id. at 646-47.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

11

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 26,
Iss. 3 REVIEW
[2000], Art. 9
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
LAW

[Vol. 26:3

56

determine their parental fitness.
More than a biological
connection is required, however; the father must "step forward"
and assume some parental responsibility or otherwise manifest
some effort to establish an actual parent-child relationship.5 7
Moreover, even if a biological father makes such an effort, he still
may not have a fundamental right to maintain that relationship.
In Michael H. v. GeraldD., for example, the Court dealt with a
biological father's parental rights in a child born to a married
woman, but conceived with him in an adulterous relationship.5 9
The biological father at some point lived with the child and
financially supported her. 6°
The California statute at issue,
however, created a presumption that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband is the husband's child. 6 ' The Court
rejected the unmarried father's claims under both procedural and
substantive due process because the state was furthering legitimate
public policies 62 and because an adulterous father's relationship
56. See id. at 657; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982)
(holding that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard failed to comport with
Due Process and that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard was required to
terminate parental rights).
57. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), an unwed father challenged New
York's putative father registry as unconstitutional for failing to give him notice and
an opportunity to be heard before the adoption of his child. See id. at 249. The
Court upheld the statute and found that Lehr failed to develop a parent-child
relationship because he failed to demonstrate a commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood "by coming forward to participate in the rearing of
his child." See id. at 261. The Court held that Lehr had not stepped forward
because he never supported, rarely saw, and never lived with his child. See id. at
267-68. Whereas, in Stanley the unwed father had made positive manifestations
such as living with his child. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. As the Court explained in
Lehr, the difference between the "developed parent-child relationship that was
implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved in Quillon
and [Lehr]" is that in the former cases the unwed fathers came forward to
participate in the rearing of their children. See id. at 26; see also Holmes, supranote
42, at 367 (stating that the Supreme Court's unwed father jurisprudence
demonstrates that "the liberty interest in family relationships is personal and is
dependent not only upon a biological tie, but also upon the manifestation of an
actual parent-child relationship").
58. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
59. See id. at 130.
60. See id. at 114 (Michael had said to others that Victoria was his child, lived
with her, supported her, and sought to be her custodial parent).
61. See id. at 115 (the statute provided that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child
of the marriage").
62. See id. at 129-30 (such public policies include an aversion to declare
children illegitimate and the promotion of peace and tranquility in the family).
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with his issue is not a fundamental right; such a relationship is not
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. " "
Recently, several state supreme courts also have addressed64
issues involving the need to protect the parent-child relationship.
In In re B.G.C.,65 an unwed father sought to vacate a mother's
consent form and intervene in the adoption proceeding to assert
his parental rights. 6 The Iowa Supreme Court denied the unwed
mother's requestS67to vacate her consent, granted the unwed father's
motion to intervene,
denied the adoption
•
68 and ordered that the
child be surrendered to the unwed father. The unwed father was
allowed to assert parental rights because he was the biological
father, had not released his parental rights and had not abandoned
the child. 69 When the adoptive parents sought to stay the order
directing them to return the child to her biological parents, 70 the
U.S. Supreme Court ultimately denied the stay, stating that
unrelated persons can not retain custody of a7 child when the
"natural parents have not been found to be unfit."
Some state courts have also addressed non-biological parental
rights in non-traditional families.12 For example, in Alison D. v.
63. Id. at 124, 129-30.
64. See, e.g., In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ill. 1994) (holding that biological
father's consent was not unnecessary for adoption); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239
(Iowa 1992); Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 104 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that
father lacked due process liberty interest in adoption even though he did not
know of the adoption until it was finalized).
65. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
66. See id. at 242.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. (the court reasoned that a paternity test had conclusively
established that he was the biological father and his parental rights were never
terminated prior to the filing of the adoption petition).
70. The adoptive parents engaged in a vigorous legal battle including
petitioning the Michigan courts to modify the Iowa Supreme Court's order. See In
re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Mich. 1993). The adoptive parents were
successful in the Michigan trial court and were awarded custody but on appeal the
custody decision of the Iowa Supreme Court was reinstated. See id. at 691. The
adoptive parents then unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court
to stay the enforcement of the custody decision. See Deboer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S.
1301, 1302 (1993).
71. See Deboer, 509 U.S. at 1302.
72. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (dealing
with a lesbian's parental rights when one partner has a child via artificial
insemination); In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Wis. 1991) (dealing with a
lesbian's parental rights when one partner has a child through adoption), overruled
by In re H.S.H.-K 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
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73
VirginiaM.,
the New York Court of Appeals had to decide whether
a woman who was a member of a dissolved lesbian relationship had
a right to maintain a relationship with a child born to her lesbian
partner during their relationship.7 4 The woman claimed to be the
child's "psychological" parent in that she had provided financial
and emotional support to the child for two and a half years. 75 The
court rejected her claim, however, declining to expand the
76
statutory definition of parent to include "psychological" parents.
Thus, as a matter of both state and federal constitutional
decisions, a parent has a constitutionally protected right to the
parent-child relationship.
Therefore, those courts that have
succeeded in protecting children's interests in the continuity of
stepparent relationships in custody determinations have had to
compromise; the courts maintained and afforded parental
"preferences" in custody decisions, but occasionally used broad,
arguably unnatural definitions of "unfitness" to overcome the
preferences and pursue children's best interests.77

73. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
74. See Alison D., 527 N.E.2d at 29. The lesbian couple lived together for
three years and decided to have children through artificial insemination. See id. at
28.
75. See id. at 28-29. The court agreed that she had in fact treated the child in
all respects as her child and helped rear the child. See id.
76. See id.; see also In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204 (holding that a lesbian
partner had no standing to seek custody or acquire visitation rights).
77. With regard to UMDA states, see, for example, Clifford v. Woodford, 320
P.2d 452, 459 (Ariz. 1957) (stepfather awarded custody of two stepdaughters upon
his wife's death following a period of ten years when they resided together as a
step-family based only on evidence of the father's absence during this same period
of time). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also stated that a natural parent is
entitled, as a matter of law, to the custody of his or her minor child unless such
custody is not in the child's best interests. See Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148,
153 (Minn. 1989). The parental preference can always be defeated, however, if
the natural parent is "unfit" or "voluntarily forfeits" custody. See, e.g., Abrams v.
Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1989) (voluntarily forfeited custody); In re
Gonzalez, 561 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (I11.
App. 1990) (voluntarily forfeited custody);
In re Stell, 783 P.2d 615, 621 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (unfit parents). As a result,
courts have taken the opportunity to liberally construe "voluntary forfeiture." See
generally Levy, supranote 15; see also infra Part V.
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IV. THE EARLY PRINCIPLES OF CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS IN
MINNESOTA

A.

Origins

The fundamental approach to child custody determinations in
Minnesota, whether between custodial
and non-custodial parents
•
V78
or parents and third parties, can be traced to at least 1895. Due
deference was given a parent's "natural rights," but the ultimate
objective was to serve the "wefare"-or what is now generally79
referred to as the "best interests"-of the child. In Flint v. Flint,
for example, in an era when the Minnesota Statutes 80 provided that
a father was entitled to custody and care of his minor children, a
husband, separated from his wife, sued in habeas corpus to gain
custody of "his" child.8 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in ruling
for the mother, explained that:
[W] hile under our statutes, the father is given the right to
the custody of his minor children, yet this right is not an
absolute legal right, beyond the control of the courts.
The cardinal principle in such matters is to regard the
benefit of the infant paramount to the claims of either
parent. While the courts will not lightly interfere with
what may be termed the "natural rights" of parents, yet
the primary object of all courts, at least in America, is to
secure the welfare of the child .... s
In 1903 in Anderson v. Anderson, when confronted with a
custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party (the
children's paternal uncle) ,84 the court extended Flint to this case in
which "natural rights" were being asserted, and denied custody to

78. See Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 65 N.W. 272 (1895).
79. 63 Minn. 187, 65 N.W. 272 (1895). Although in the Flint case the
Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a custody dispute between natural
parents, see id. at 190, 65 N.W.2d at 272, the case is cited as early as 1903 for the
law in custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party. See Anderson
v. Anderson, 89 Minn. 198, 200, 94 N.W. 681, 682 (1903).
80. 1894 Gen. Laws § 4540.
81. See Flint, 63 Minn. at 187, 65 N.W. at 272.
82. Id. at 187, 65 N.W. at 273.
83. 89 Minn. 198, 94 N.W. 681 (1903).
84. See id. at 199, 94 N.W.at 681. The paternal uncle's wife also was a party to
the suit. See id.
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the father. As part of what apparently was an examination of the
"welfare" interests of the children, the trial court found the father
"unfit."8 6 "[The evidence of the father's poor behavior does] not
indicate a mind of that grade and type which would naturally know
and do what was for the best interests of young children .... 8s
This finding of parental "unfitness" was not pre-requisite to third
party standing, nor was it determinative of the custody issue; it
merely was probative with regard to the broader issue of the
children's' best interests. Indeed, even if the father had been
found fit, he still could have lost custody to the non-parent. "The
fact that the parent desires to recover possession of his children,
and the fact that, within the meaning of the law, he may not have
been shown
to be an unsuitable person, is not necessarily
88
decisive."
B.

The Evolution of the "SuperiorRights" Doctrine (the Presumption of
ParentalFitness) in Minnesota

Two years after Anderson, in Lehman v. Martin,8 9 the Minnesota
Supreme Court granted a father custody of his daughter to the
exclusion of the maternal grandmother, firmly establishing the
"superior rights" doctrine in Minnesota. 9° Natural parents now
were presumed fit to raise their children and the burden to prove
unfitness would be on the non-parent.9' This holding appeared to
85. See id. at 200, 94 N.W. at 682.
86. See id. (noting testimony regarding the father's intemperance, immorality
and "erratic nature").
87. Id.
88. Id. Another interesting aspect of the Anderson decision was the court's
willingness to allow the father's new wife to "supplement" the father's parental
shortcomings, as opposed to requiring him to qualify on his own merits. See id.
Although the court denied the father custody, the court gave the father a chance
in the future to qualify vicariously through his new wife:
[W]e are unwilling to hold that his habits and temperament are so
different from those of a large class of men that he should for that reason
be picked out and branded as an unfit person to have charge of his own
children, if he established a home, and the stepmother is a suitable
person to assume the responsibility thereof. But, unless the wife is qualified
to protect the childrenfrom such influences as thefather seems naturally to impart,
it may well be doubted whether, as matter of right, he is in a position to claim them.
Id. at 201, 94 N.W. at 682 (emphasis added).
89. 95 Minn. 121,103 N.W. 888 (1905).
90. See id. at 122, 103 N.W. at 889.
91. See Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 265, 187 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1971);
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directly contradict Anderson, implying that in a contest between a
natural parent and a third party, parental fitness was "the only
question":
The only question for our consideration is whether, from
the evidence submitted, respondent is a fit and suitable
person to have the custody and care of his child.... [The
father's right] is paramount and superior to that of any
other person, and prima facie entitles him to the
judgment of the courts, unless the evidence shows that the
child's welfare demands and requires that [the child]
remain with [the grandmother]....
The question
presented is whether the evidence adduced by [the
grandmother] sustains the contention that [the father] is
unfit to care for his child.9 2
C.

The Age and Preferences of the Child

In Gauthier v. Gauthier,93 the same court seemed to dispel the
notion that parental "unfitness" was prerequisite to third party
custody. It concluded, just five years after Lehman, that a boy's
natural father was fit but that custody nonetheless should be
awarded to a third party.94 The boy was fifteen years old at the time

the court heard the case and had lived with the third party since he
was two. When questioned about his custody preferences, the boy
responded in favor of the third party. Nonetheless, even though

Nelson v. Whaley, 264 Minn. 535, 545, 75 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1956); Olson v.
Sorenson, 208 Minn. 226, 228, 293 N.W. 241, 242 (1940); Platzter v. Beardsley, 149
Minn. 435, 438, 183 N.W. 956, 957 (1921).
92. Lehman, 95 Minn. at 122, 103 N.W. at 888. This seeming contradiction
subsequently has not been reconciled.
93. 110 Minn. 103, 124 N.W. 634 (1910).
94. See id. at 106, 124 N.W. at 635. With respect to the father's fitness, the
Minnesota Supreme court stated:
The learned judge who presided at the hearing of this matter in the
district court found that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
[father] was an unfit person to have the custody of his son.... An
examination of the evidence submitted in the district court convinces us
that it was sufficient to justify the findings as to the character of the

parties ....
Id. at 105, 124 N.W. at 634.
95.

See id. at 104, 124 N.W. at 634.

96.

See id. at 105, 124 N.W. at 635.
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the Gauthier holding seemed to return to the earlier principles of
Anderson-that parental fitness is not the only issue in third party
custody disputes--Gauthierappeared to be limited to a mature
minor's choice.97
Thus, custody would be granted to a third party to the
exclusion of a parent in only two narrow occasions: 1) when the
child is old enough to give a mature opinion regarding custody and
no reason arose to disregard that opinion; and 2) when the parent
is unfit:
When the child is so young that its own preferences
cannot be considered, the character of him to whom the
custody is awarded is generally controlling; and unless the
person in whom the natural right rests is shown to be
entirely unfit no court would be justified in arbitrarily
depriving parents of the custody of their children. But
when the minor has reached an age sufficient to have an
intelligent and well-defined preference.., it is apparent
that
his
inclination
must
be
taken
into
consideration .... 98

97. In Neib v. Krueger, 143 Minn. 149, 173 N.W. 414, (1919), a boy's mother
died shortly after his birth, whereupon he was given into the care of a close
relative (his grandmother). See id. at 149, 173 N.W. 414. Like Gauthier, the
custody dispute arose when the child was relatively older, about 14 years of age,
and as in Gauthier, the boy was questioned as to his preferences, to which he
responded in favor of his grandmother. See id. at 150, 173 N.W. at 414. The
Minnesota Supreme Court, citing Gauthier, granted custody to the grandmother.
See id.
98. Gauthier,110 Minn. at 106, 124 N.W. at 635. Interestingly, this statement
from Gauthier closely anticipated present-day statutory standards regarding child
custody. Minnesota Statute section 518.17, subdivision 1, entitled "Custody and
Support of Children on Judgment," reads in part: "'The best interests of the child'
means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court
including: ... the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference;..." Minnesota Statute section
257.025 (a), entitled "Custody Disputes," reads in part:
In any proceeding where two or more parties seek custody of a child the
court shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors in determining the
best interests of the child, including the following factors:... the
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference; ...
MINN. STAT. § 257.025(a) (1998).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/9

18

200

Schlam: Third
PartyPARTY
Custody CUSTODY
Disputes in Minnesota:
Overcoming the "Natura
THIRD
DISPUTES

In 1929, for example, in Feeley v. Williams, in a custody dispute
over a 1 2 -year-old girl,'0 the decision appeared to rest largely
upon the girl's wishes.'0 ' The court denied custody to the natural
parent because the child was "of the age and capacity to form a
rational judgment" and wished to stay in her present
environment.
Soon after Feeley, however, it became apparent that even in a
custody dispute over an older child, the child's preferences would
not be determinative. In the mid-1930s, for example, in Herniman
v. Markson'0 3 and Vik v. Sivertson,'0 third party custody disputes
arose over children that were of the same age as the child in
Feeley.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed granting custody
to the natural parents in those cases, but in both cases entirely
failed to discuss the children's wishes. Thus, by the 1930s, it no
longer was clear that the Feeley decision turned (or that similar cases
in the future would turn) solely on the age and wishes of the child.
D. ExtraordinaryCircumstances?
In 1914, in Larson v. Halverson,1°6 the Minnesota Supreme
Court also appeared to look beyond the sole issue of parental
fitness in affording granting to third parties. In Larson, a young girl
suffered from tuberculosis and required an "outdoor life...
among congenial surroundings."10 7 "IT]he home life on [the
grandparent's] farm [was found to be] best suited" for her
continued health.'O" Accordingly, the court found the girl's natural
father fit, but awarded custody to her maternal grandparents.'1 9 In
99. 176 Minn. 193, 222 N.W. 927 (1929).
100. Id. at 195, 222 N.W. at 928.
101. Id. at 196, 222 N.W. at 928 ("Our decision rests largely upon the
judgment of the child.").
102. See id.
103. 187 Minn. 176, 244 N.W. 687 (1932).
104. 194 Minn. 380, 260 N.W. 522 (1935).
105. The child in Feeley was 12
years of age. See Feeley, 176 Minn. at 195, 222
N.W. at 928. The children in Hernimanand Vik were 12 years of age. See Herniman,
187 Minn. at 176, 244 N.W. at 687; Vi, 194 Minn. at 380, 260 N.W. at 522.
106. 127 Minn. 387, 149 N.W. 664 (1914).
107. Id. at 390, 149 N.W. at 665.
108. Id.
109. See id. With respect to the father's fitness, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated:
The evidence before us discloses the ability and fitness of the father, from
a pecuniary point of view, to support his daughter; but whether her

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

19

William
Mitchell LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 26,LAW
Iss. 3 [2000],
Art. 9
WILLIAM
REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

awarding custody to the grandparents, the court reiterated
principles of Flint and Anderson, indicating that: "This situation
differentiates the case from many of those where the natural right
of the father has been given effect, for it centers around and aims
at the welfare of the child, which is paramount to the natural
paternal right." 110 Larson, therefore, extended the earlier principle
of Anderson ("unfitness" is only one issue to be considered) beyond
the facts of Gauthier (if a child is old enough, for example, his
decision will prevail notwithstanding parental fitness) to matters of
medical exigencies or other extraordinary circumstances.
E. Defeating the "SuperiorRights" Doctrine: Are There "Grave and
Weighty" Reasons to Do So?
Gauthierand Larson made clear that custody could be awarded
to third parties for reasons other than parental unfitness. But
would it be enough to show that the non-parent could give the
child a better life or that the non-parent and the child had
developed a strong and healthy bond? The Minnesota Supreme
Court answered these questions in Rennings v. Armstrong.' There,
a girl's mother died shortly after her birth, 112 and the child's father
voluntarily gave her to the care of a maternal aunt."3 When the girl
was about eight years old, her father remarried and demanded her
return.n In returning custody to the father, the court stated:
While the best interests of the child is the controlling
question in controversies of this kind, the natural right of
the parent cannot be set aside on sentimental grounds,
nor upon the theory that perhaps the child will receive
more tender care at the hands of those having its actual
custody and control. No doubt [the aunt] would give to
this child the same kindly treatment and care as she would

interests and welfare, in view of her physical condition will justify taking
her from her present home and surroundings, is so clouded in doubt
and uncertainty... that we conclude that she should.., remain with her

grandparents and her aunt ....
Id. at 389, 149 N.W. at 665.
110. Id. at 390, 149 N.W. at 665.
111.
112.

141 Minn. 47, 169 N.W. 249 (1918).
See id. at48, 169 N.W. at249.

113.
114.

See id.
See id.
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bestow upon her own children. But that is not the test in
such cases.I5
In 1921, for example, in Platzer v. Beardsly,1 6 a third party
alleged that a mother had no suitable home or place to keep her
daughter and was without means to support her.
The Minnesota
Supreme Court, in granting custody to the mother, established the
11
burden of proof of unfitness to be met by third parties:
The ties by which mother and child are bound together
should not be severed except for grave and weighty reasons

The mere fact that a mother is so destitute or
impoverished that she cannot adequately provide for the
needs of her child, and that someone else is willing to take
it and give it better educational and material advantages,
does not justify the court in transferring its custody.

115. Id. In Machgan v. Pelowski, 145 Minn. 383, 386, 177 N.W. 627, 628 (1920),
however, while granting a father custody of his daughter to the exclusion of her
maternal grandparents, the court hinted that a third party's disposition of
financial resources might play a role in their decision: "[W]e should not be
unmindful of the pecuniary advantage that may inure to [the child] by the
agreement that by will she should be assured of her share of the [third party's]
inheritance." Id. Other cases provide that the possibility of inheritance is not a
factor to be considered in deciding custody between a parent and a third party.
See Fossen v. Hitman, 164 Minn. 373, 375, 205 N.W. 267, 267-68 (1925) ("Best
interests... does not mean that the child may have.., greater prospect of
inheritance with others than with the natural parents; ... ).
116. 149 Minn. 435,183 N.W. 956 (1921). The Platzercase was the result of an
unwed mother signing an agreement with a third party consenting to the child's
adoption. See id. at 436, 183 N.W. 956-57. The third party filed in court for
adoption, and the mother appeared at the hearing, stating her intent to withdraw
and revoke her consent to the adoption. See id. at 436, 183 N.W. at 957. The child
was still in the custody of the third party, who based its custody rights on the
written agreement and the child's best interests. See id. at 437, 183 N.W. at 957.
The mother, on the same day, applied for a writ of habeas corpus for the return of
the child. See id. at 436, 183 N.W. at 957. The Minnesota Supreme Court resolved
the adoption issue quickly (in one sentence) by merely stating that the third party
could not adopt the child without the mother's consent. See id. at 437, 183 N.W. at
957. The court, having disposed of the "written agreement" issue, was then left
solely with the issue of the best interests of the child. See id. Thus, even though
Platzer began as an adoption case, it turned into a "garden variety" custody dispute.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., In re H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981) (stating that
grave and weighty reasons must exist to deprive natural parents of custody);
Jaroszewski v. Prestidge, 249 Minn. 80, 89, 81 N.W. 2d 705, 710 (1957) (same);
Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 545, 75 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1956) (same); Vik v.
Sivertson, 194 Minn. 380, 381, 260 N.W. 522, 523 (1935) (same).
119. Platzer,149 Minn. at 438, 183 N.W. at 958 (emphasis added).
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However, even if poverty is not a ground for depriving parents
of custody, a parent still must be capable of providing some
minimum level of "proper" benefits and guidance. In Fossen v.
Hitman120 the court stated in no uncertain terms that:
[IT] he natural parents have the first right to the care and
custody of the child, unless the best interests of the child
require it to be given into the hands of some one else....
[I]f in the parents there is such lack of moral stamina or
ability to gain a livelihood that it is made to appear that
the child must go without proper education and moral
training or suffer want under their care and custody, then
the best interests of the child is at stake. Mere poverty of
the parents is seldom, if ever, a sufficient ground for
depriving them of the natural right to the custody of their
child ....12'
Parental unfitness, therefore, is not considered a prerequisite
to third party custody; it simply is one factor affecting the best
interests of the child. One part of the equation is the reasonable
assumption that parents tend to care for their children more than
third parties, and since parental custody is presumed in the best
interests of children, parents should have a "natural right" to
custody. On the other side are factors that militate in favor of third
parties-parental unfitness, the age and preferences of the child
and extraordinary circumstances such as unusual medical needs of
the child.
Parents could lose their preference in custody
determinations for any of these "grave and weighty" reasons.
F

Indefinite Voluntary Relinquishment:Abandonment as "Unfitness"?

By the late 1920s, it was clear that in addition to parental
"unfitness" or extraordinary circumstances in the child's life, such
as unusual "medical needs,"122 another basis for third party custody
120. 164 Minn. 373, 205 N.W. 267 (1925).
121. Id. at 375, 205 N.W. at 267 (emphasis added).
122. For a case that is similar to Larson, see Lund v. Anderson, 175 Minn. 518,
518, 221 N.W. 868, 868 (1928), where the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a
custody dispute between the father of two children, and the children's maternal
grandmother. The children's mother was hospitalized and in critical condition
due to tuberculosis. See id. The father was trying to help pay for her medical bills,
but was not finding success. See id. The children were aged six months and two
years, and the younger child was suffering from a tubercular condition that
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claims are situations in which otherwise "fit" parents abandon their
children. Indeed, indefinitely relinquishing parental custody,
especially when it permits development of de facto parent-child
relationships with others, may be tantamount to unfitness. In
Henning v. Gundvaldson, for example, a custody dispute arose
between a young girl's mother and the mother's maternal aunt
(and the aunt's husband). 124 The girl was nearly four years old
when the court heard the case and had been in the aunt's custody
nearly all of her life. 25 The mother was unable to care for the girl
during this time but had recently 26
married a man with a substantial
home.1
comfortable
a
and
income
Despite the presumption of parental fitness ordinarily afforded
natural parents and the mother's changed circumstances, the court
awarded custody to the aunt and uncle with whom the child had
bonded.
The mother's voluntary abandonment and the
emergence of the "psychological" bond with third party caretakers
overcame the presumption that returning custody to the parent
would be in the child's best interests.1 s Under such circumstances,
the burden shifted to the parent to prove she was fit to regain
custody:
The evidence does not assure us that the [mother and her
new husband] will continue in their desire and ability to
care for the child and give it the home which it should
have.... The time may come when it will be apparent
that the mother is secure in a suitable home which will

necessitated unusual care. See id. at 518-19, 221 N.W. at 868-69. The grandmother
was a practicing nurse. See id. at 519, 221 N.W. at 868. The court concluded that
the father had not been shown to be unfit, but continued custody in the
grandmother, saying:
In this case the situation is unusual. The children need, and are getting,
extraordinary attention and care, which [the father], for want of money
and facilities, cannot give them. He is already burdened in meeting his
obligations incident to the condition of his wife. We think it best for the
children to remain where they are.

Id.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

169 Minn. 335, 211 N.W. 310 (1926).
See id. at 335, 211 N.W. at 310.
Seeid. at 336, 211 N.W. at 310.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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welcome her child permanently and that the natural right
of a parent to custody should be given its full effect."
In Feeley, the dispute was between a girl's father and her
maternal aunt.' 3° The girl had been voluntarily placed in the care
of the aunt when the father was imprisoned.
When he was
released a year later, he failed to make any contact with his
daughter over a four-year period and contributed essentially
nothing to his daughter's support or education. 32 While under
then current law the court could have considered the girl's view in
denying the father custody since she was "approaching the
threshold of womanhood ....

the court's primary motivation in

denying him custody, may have been abandonment, since "[t]he
record [was] quite barren of evidence manifesting a father's
affection for the child while she has been out of his custody."134
Then, in the 1930s, in the cases of Herniman v. Markson135 and
Vik v. Sivertson,136 the Minnesota Supreme Court re-enforced the
significance of voluntarily relinquished parental rights and the
concurrent development of de facto parent-child relationships. In
Herniman, the dispute was between a boy's mother and his maternal
grandparents.137 In this case the mother visited her son reasonably
often, contributing to his support to the extent she could.'3 The
court largely was silent on how the boy came to live with his
relatives,• • but noted that the
not completely or
139 mother did
indefinitely abandon her son. Similarly, in Vik, a dispute between
a girl's mother and her maternal aunt,'4 the court noted that the
mother visited her daughter at times and had contributed toward
her support and care.' 4 '
Considering the factual distinctions

129. Id.
130. See Feeley v. Williams, 176 Minn. 193, 194 222 N.W. 927 (1929). The aunt
was joined by her husband in the action. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 195-96, 222 N.W. at 928.
134. Id. at 195, 222 N.W. at 928.
135. 187 Minn. 176, 244 N.W. 687 (1932).
136. 194 Minn. 380, 260 N.W. 522 (1935).
137. Herniman, 187 Minn. at 176, 244 N.W. at 687. The grandparents were
joined by their daughter (the child's aunt) in the custody action. See id.
138. See id. at 178, 244 N.W. at 688.
139. See id. ("She did not abandon her child.").
140.

See Vik, 194 Minn. at 381, 260 N.W. at 522.

141.

See id.
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between Feeley, on one hand, and Herniman and Vik on the other,
voluntary and indefinite child abandonment as a ground for
custody in third parties emerged.
This proposition gained further support in the 1943 case of
In Ashcrofl, the girl was six years old, 143 placing
Ashcroft v. Jensen.
her below the age at which the court might defer to her opinion.
Thus, the court could not rely on Neib v. Krueger'44 and Gauthier,

presumably decided on the basis of the preferences of a mature
minor, nor on Larson and Lund, 4 5 because no evidence indicated
that the child had any special health problems. Moreover,
although the court had some misgivings about the parent's
home, it found nothing to indicate that the parents were morally
custody
unfit. 147 The mother placed her daughter in the exclusive
148
however,
old,
months
of a third party when the girl was only a few
and provided little support over the years.9 Consequently, the
150
court denied the parents custody in favor of the third party.
a custody dispute between an
Similarly, in RYS-- v. .Vorlicek,
,152
eleven-year-old girl's father and maternal aunt, the girl wanted to
stay with her aunt and uncle. 153 In earlier times, this factor might
have been an adequate reason to decide in favor of the third
parties. In this instance, however, the court noted that during the
girl's lifetime the father had seen her only a few times and never

142. 214 Minn. 193, 7 N.W.2d 393 (1943).
143. See id. at 193, 7 N.W.2d at 394.
144. 143 Minn. 149, 173 N.W. 414 (1919).
145. See Lund v. Anderson, 175 Minn. 518, 221 N.W. 868 (1928).
146. See Ashcroft, 214 Minn. at 196, 7 N.W.2d at 395 ("Neither are we satisfied
that we know the kind of home the child would have should it go to Oregon with
the Ashcrofts.").
147. See id. at 195, 7 N.W.2d at 394 ("Investigations... indicate nothing to
suggest that the Ashcrofts are morally unfit to have the custody of their child.").
148. See id. at 194, 7 N.W.2d at 394. Although the mother claimed her child
was forcibly taken from her, and then hidden from her, there was testimony that
the child was given into the care of the third party with the consent of the mother.
See id. The court stated that "[t] here are sufficient improbabilities in the story of
[the mother] to raise the question of its credibility." Id. at 196, 7 N.W.2d at 395.
149. See id. at 194, 7 N.W.2d at 394. The father also failed to visit or support
his daughter. See id. at 196, 7 N.W.2d at 395.
150. See id. at 196-97, 7 N.W.2d at 395 ("We conceive that serious emotional
and psychological maladjustment would result if the child were transferred from
the Jensen to the Ashcroft home.").
151. 229 Minn. 497, 40 N.W.2d 350 (1949).
152. See id. at 498, 40 N.W.2d at 350.
153. See id. at 501-02, 40 N.W.2d at 352.
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assumed any support obligations.
As in Ashcroft, the court
couched its decision in terms of the ultimate psychological well
being of the child: "[the father] has offered absolutely no excuse
for completely ignoring his child. So far as the child is concerned,
the father is a complete stranger to her. By his past conduct, [the
father],5 5for all intents and purposes, has completely abandoned his
child."
Thus, although earlier courts seemed less concerned about
such matters,' 56 by the time of Ashcroft and RYS, separating children
from defacto parents was considered contrary to the children's "best
interests."
When this bond with third parties resulted from
parental abandonment, the harm in removing a child from the
third party caregivers could outweigh the "superior rights" of
parents.
Indeed, by 1956, in Nelson v. Whaley, 15 the court
specifically included abandonment among the broad grounds that
might outweigh parental preferences in pursing the children's best
interests in custody determinations: "In order to justify depriving a
parent of the custody of a child in favor of third persons there must
be a grave reason growing out of neglect, abandonment, incapacity,
moral delinquency, instability of character, or inability to furnish
the child with needed care."'m By the 1960s, therefore, it appeared
that third parties were able to argue the children's best interests to
the court directly, with parental circumstances serving as only one
variable in the equation.
V.

WALLIN V. WALLIN: THIRD PARTY CUSTODY IN THE MODERN ERA

In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Wallin v.
Wallin,159 in which an original divorce decreegave custody of a sixyear-old girl to her paternal grandparents.'
The girl's mother
appealed, arguing that she was entitled to custody as a matter of

154. See id. at 501, 40 N.W.2d at 352.
155. Id. at 501-02, 40 N.W.2d at 352 ("We are convinced that it would cause
serious emotional and psychological disturbances to force [the child] to change
her place and mode of living at this time.").
156. See Herniman v. Markson, 187 Minn. 176, 244 N.W. 687 (1932). The
court dismissed the matter by opining that: "The boy will soon accommodate
himself to his changed surroundings." Id. at 179, 244 N.W. at 688.
157. 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956).
158. Id. at 544-45, 75 N.W.2d at 792 (emphasis added).
159. 290 Minn. 261,187 N.W.2d 627 (1971).
160. See id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 628.
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presumptive right.1 61 In its decision, the court first attempted to
summarize the law to date with respect to third party custody
disputes:
In determining custody disputes between [a parent] of a
minor child and [a third party], courts have based their
decisions on two basic doctrines. The first of these
doctrines stands for the proposition that [parents are]
entitled to the custody of [their] children unless it clearly
appears that [they are] unfit or [have] abandoned [their]
right to custody, or unless there are some extraordinary
circumstances which would require that [they] be
deprived of custody. The second doctrine is the so-called
best-interests-of-the-child concept, according to which the
welfare and interest of the child is the primary test to be
applied in awarding custody.' 62
This so-called "first doctrine" reiterated the judicial approach
affording preferences to parents in third party custody disputes
that could be outweighed by a variety of factors includingunfitness.
The "second doctrine" also affirmed the established principle that
regardless of whether a parent's presumptive right to custody has
been overcome, the ultimate goal in custody determinations is the
best interests of the child. The question of whether parents are
unfit or forfeited their natural right to custody continued to
represent only one factor impacting the ultimate judicial evaluation
of the "best interests" of children. Indeed, farther along in the
Wallin opinion, the court supported this overriding principle:
[A]ll things being equal, as against a third person, a
natural [parent is] entitled as a matter of law to custody of
[their] minor child unless there has been established on
the [parent's] part neglect, abandonment, incapacity,
moral delinquency, instability of character, or inability to
furnish the child with needed care, or unless it has been
established that such custody otherwise would not be in the best
welfare and interest of the child.163
Several cases interpreting Wallin, however, while supporting a
161.
162.
163.

See id.
Id. at 264, 187 N.W.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
Id. at 266, 187 N.W.2d at 630 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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single "best interests" criterion for child custody decisions,
appeared to raise additional questions about the burden and
standard of proof in third party custody disputes articulated in
Wallin. For example, in Tubwon v. Weisberg,'64 decided in 1986, the
Minnesota Court• of
,,165Appeals referred to Wallin as establishing a
"two-part standard.
In Tubwon, the court noted that the trial
court found parental "unfitness"'1 66 and that it would be in the
child's best interests to remain with the third party, but added:
The best interests of the child is the second part of the
Wallin standard and applies in determining custody
between a biological parent and a third party. The trial
court's finding that [the child's] best interests require
granting custody to [the third party] is supported by the
evidence. This is based on the same evidence that
supports [the mother's] parental unfitness and an
evaluation of [the third party] as a parent.161
Thus, although parental "unfitness" was important in
evaluating the child's best interests, it was not the only
consideration, nor was it a prerequisite for third party custody. A
balancing test would seem to exist where the parent or nonparent
with more than a preponderance of the evidence in his or her favor
would win. However, In re P.L.C. & D.L. C., 16 issued that same
term, may have made the burden of proof for third parties more
difficult. The court noted that the child's best interests and the
169
presumption of parental fitness were important considerations,
164.

394 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Tubwon, the custody dispute

was between a man and a woman who were never married. See id. at 602. The
dispute was over two children; the younger child was the biological child of this
couple, and the older child was the biological child of the woman and another
man. See id. at 601-02. Consequently, with respect to the older child, the custody

dispute was between a natural parent and a third party. The trial court awarded
custody of both children to the man. See id. at 601.

165.
166.

See id. at 603.
See id. at 604.

167.
168.

Id. (emphasis added).
384 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

169.

See id. at 225 ("[The] standard involves a combined consideration of the 'best

interests of the child' and the presumption of parental fitness."). The P.L.C. court
also stated that "there is no conflict between the two [ Wallin] standards." Id. at 225.
However, in In re N.M.O, 399 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), after again citing
Wallin for the proposition that the resolution of third party custody disputes had
always "employed two basic principles," id. at 702, that court stated the Wallin
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and that third parties "had to show 'grave reasons' for preferring
them to a natural parent for custody,"7 but then went further. It
stated that "[t]hese ['grave'] reasons [must] approach those
required for the termination of parental rights.
Even though
similar language was not in Wallin, this P.L.C. language may imply a
stricter standard of proof for third party custody-the72
evidence"
constitutionally-required "clear and S. convincing
173
required for termination of parental rights.
VI. RECONCILING WALLINWITH SUBSEQUENT STATUTORY CUSTODY
PROVISIONS

In 1978, seven years after Wallin, the Minnesota Legislature
enacted a statutory provision that provided that "a person other
than a parent" may commence child custody proceedings.174 This
broad statutory language essentially precludes most standing
challenges brought against third parties. Thus the best interests of
the child became the focus in custody determinations made under
this provision.
In 1990, for example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided
Westpahl v. Westpahl, 76 in which a young girl's paternal
grandparents claimed that the girl should be removed from her
mother's custody and placed with them. 77 The grandparents'
request arose as a result of problematic behavior by or between the
girl's parents. 7

Minnesota

Statute section 518.18(d), which

standards were "sometimes conflicting." Id. at 703.
170. P.L.C., 384 N.W.2d at 225 (citing Pikula v. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d 322, 325
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985), which
in turn cites Wallin).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
In 1988, in an unpublished opinion, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals also stated: "To overcome the presumption of fitness,
the parties seeking custody must show 'grave reasons' approachingthose requiredfor
the termination ofparentalrights." In re T.R.M.G., No. CX-88-489, 1988 WL 88552, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1988) (emphasis added).
172. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
173. See In re L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1996); In reM.H., 595 N.W.2d
223, 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the standard of proof as clear and
convincing for an involuntary termination of parental fights).
174. See 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 772, § 33 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 518.156
(1998)).
175. See In re M.A.L., 457 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
176. 457 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
177. See id. at 228.
178. The child's parents were divorced in 1983, and the court had placed
physical custody in the girl's mother. See id. at 227. In 1985, custody was
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governed the case, provided that a custody order may not be
changed unless (1) the parties agree to modification; (2) the child
has been integrated into the petitioner's home with the consent of
the other party; or (3) the child's current environment endangers
the child, physically or emotionally, and the harm caused by a
changed environment would be outweighed by the benefits of
changing custody.'79
The parties in Westpahl did not agree to a custody change, nor
180
had the girl been integrated into the grandparent's home.
Consequently, the only ground to sustain the requested
modification was that maternal custody had "endangered" the
child.
The grandparents made no prima facie showing of
endangerment and the trial court dismissed their claim. 8 In doing
so, however, the court attempted to harmonize the required
18
findings of section 518.18 with the seminal Wallin decision,
transferred to the girl's father after if was alleged that the mother's new spouse
had sexually abused the girl and, as a corollary allegation, which the mother had
failed to protect the girl. See id. In 1987, custody was transferred back to the
mother after it was alleged that the father was sexually abusing the girl. See id.
The 1987 custody order was only temporary and when the mother moved for
permanent custody, the paternal grandparents stepped in, asking for a
modification of the custody order in their favor. See id. at 227-28.
179. SeeMINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1998). Section 518.18(d) provides that:
If the court has jurisdiction to determine child custody matters, the
court shall not modify a prior custody order unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts.., that have arisen since the prior order or that were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, that a change
has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties and
that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. In applying these standards the court shall retain the custody
arrangement established by the prior order unless:
(i) both parties agree to the modification;
(ii) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner
with the consent of the other party; or
(iii) the child's present environment endangers the child's physical
or emotional health or impairs the child's emotional development
and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.
Id.
180. See Westpah4 457 N.W.2d at 227-28.
181. See id. at 228.
182. The Westpahl decision was not the first time Minnesota courts had
attempted to "harmonize" the WaUin decision with Minnesota Statute section
518.18. In 1988, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Durkin v. Hinich, 431
N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), which, like Westpah4 was a third party custody
dispute in the context of a prior custody order. See id. at 554. In Durkin, the trial
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stating that:
First, the non-parent may show the natural parent is unfit
to have custody. [citations omitted] Such a showing
corresponds to the requirement in section 518.18(d)(iii)
that the court find the current custody endangers the
child. Second, the Wallin court recognized that the
"overriding consideration" in deciding custody is the best
interests of the child. This analysis recognizes that certain
extra-ordinary situations may exist in which the child's
best interests require placement with a non-parent....
[Finally, s]ection 518.18(d) (ii), which allows modification
in favor of a noncustodian where the child has been
integrated into the
movant's. family
with
the consent of
•
.
183
the custodian, reflects these situations.
Westpahl, in attempting to reaffirm principles of earlier
Minnesota law, now presumably codified in section 518.18, may
also have added some confusion as well as clarity. Since Westpahl
did not mention "abandonment"-presumably because it had long
been thought of as tantamount to unfitness'84-the practicing bar
reasonably might have continued to assume that abandonment was
subsumed under the broad definition of unfitness. Yet the court's
further
assertion
that "unfitness" corresponds
to the
"endangerment" requirement of section 518.18 arguably suggests a
different and significantly higher burden for third party custody: a
showing of not just abandonment, but abandonment that
endangered the child. Indeed, the court flatly states: "[T]he Wallin
court employed section 518.18 in its decision. See id. at 555. In its analysis, the
court of appeals stated that the trial court's decision was consistent with the
principles enunciated in Wallin. Id. at 557. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals decision, engaging in a similar comparison between
Wallin and section 518.18. See Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Minn.
1989). Yet it is hard to understand why the court of appeals felt the need to make
a comparison in the first place. Section 518.18 provides a "self-contained" analysis,
free from any need to be "harmonized" with existing decisions. No matter what
the status of the parties-whether the dispute is between two parents, between a
parent and a third party, or between two third parties-the analysis provided by
section 518.18 is the same so long as there has been a prior custody order by the
court.
183. Westpahl, 457 N.W.2d at 229 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
184. For the notion that abandonment is really a part of the parental fitness
analysis, see In re T.R.M.G., No. CX-88-489, 1988 WL 88552, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1988) ("Unfitness for custody purposes involves 'neglect, abandonment,
incapacity .... ).
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recognition of the importance of considering the child's best
interests does not allow a court to remove custody from a parent to
non-parents based only on the application of the best interest
court must find that the child's custody endangers
standard. 8The
5
the child.",

However, while abandonment endangering a child appears to
be clear and convincing evidence of neglect, meeting the standard
for termination, 81 6 previous decisions modifying custody required
only "grave and weighty" reasons "approaching, [but not necessarily
meeting] those required for the termination of parental rights."""
Requiring endangerment might now exclude as a ground for
modifying custody the voluntary, indefinite relinquishment of
parental custody not endangering the child. Yet relinquishment
done in conjunction with de facto quasi-parental bonding had
supported third party custody decisions in the past.
On the other hand, this problem may now be dealt with in two
alternative ways. First, the "integration [of a child] into the [third
party's] family with the consent of the custodian " ' 88 is now an
explicit, independent statutory basis for modification to third party
custody. Second, in subsuming the "extraordinary circumstances"
justification of older decisions, Westpahl also might have included
the circumstances of abandonment in conjunction with nonparental bonding as a ground for third party custody. Several
unpublished opinions during the 1990s, while not appropriate for
citation as authority,""' nevertheless provide some clarification on
these issues. In 1993, in In re B.L.H & D.A.H.,' 90 the Minnesota
185.

Westpahl, 457 N.W.2d at 229 (emphasis added).

186. Of course, on the other hand, proceedings for permanent custody may
involve different issues and may be maintained concurrently with neglect
proceedings. See In re Hall, 268 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1978). Further, the
concepts of seeking permanent custody and termination of parental rights are not
mutually exclusive; a third party could be awarded permanent legal and physical
custody subject to reasonable visitation by natural parents. See In re E.A.Q.D. and
T.L.D., 405 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
187. In re T.R.M.G., 1998 WL 88552, at *2 (emphasis added). Westpahl claims
that the "endangerment" requirement of section 518.18 "corresponds" to the
parental fitness part of the Wallin analysis. See Westpahl, 457 N.W.2d at 229.

However, "endangerment" is a term broad enough to encompass matters beyond
unfitness. Indeed, it could encompass "extraordinary situations," which would at

the same time be included in the so-called "second part" of the Wallin test,
whether the transfer would serve the best interests of the child.
188. MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (ii) (1998).
189. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd. 3(b) (1998).
190. No. CO-93-175, 1993 WL 216896 (Minn. Ct. App.June 22, 1993).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/9
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Court of Appeals stated that:
Wallin... provides that a standard of "unfitness" governs
cases where a natural parent should lose custody. This
standard closely resembles the endangerment standard
under the child custody modification statute. [However,]
an exception to the requirement of "unfitness" may exist under
Wallin in compelling circumstances such as those where a child
has been integrated into a third party's home. In such cases, the
best interests of the child may require the court to preserve a clearly
established alternative parenting relationship, even though the
naturalparent isfit.191
B.L.H. may be reconciled with Westpahl in that proceedings for
permanent custody involve different issues than neglect
proceedings,' 9' and thus petitions for permanent custody and
termination of parental rights are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
third parties have been awarded permanent legal and physical
custody subject to reasonable visitation br natural parents.
Finally, in deciding In re A.D. W 9 in 1997, the court of
appeals held that abandonment "contradicts the presumption that
a natural parent is entitled to custody [but it is] only one part of
the two-prong test that looks at both parental preference and the
best interest of the child." 9 ' "First, the nonparent has the burden
of presenting evidence to overcome the presumption of parental
fitness and must show that the natural parent is unfit to have
custody....
Second, the best interests of the child is the
'overriding consideration' in custody determinations."196 Thus, it
seems that even where circumstances fall short of grounds for
termination of parental rights, voluntary parental abandonment of

191. Id. at *1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In 1994 as well, in In re
K.K.M., No. CO-93-1584, 1994 WL 62149, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994), the
Minnesota Court of Appeals cited Wallin for the proposition that "[t]he
presumption that a natural parent is fit to raise his or her own child may be
overturned if it is established that the parent is unfit or that the parent's custody
otherwise would not be in the best interests of the child." Id. (emphasis added).
192. See In re Hall, 268 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1978).
193. See In re E.A.Q.D. & T.L.D., 405 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
194. No. C9-96-1887, 1997 WL 132989 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1997).
195. Id. at *2.
196. In re S.M.A., No. C8-97-76, 1997 WL 526299, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug.
26, 1997) (quoting Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 262, 187 N.W.2d 627, 630
(1971)).
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a child to a "clearly established alternative parenting relationship"
may allow for third party custody under several theories. 197 What
remains, perhaps, is the question of how future courts might
effectively and accurately determine exactly when these
circumstances have occurred.'98
VII. ANALYSIS
Post-Wallin, it is clear that either unfitness or abandonment
that may not amount to neglect sufficient for terminating parental
rights will negate any preferences in child custody disputes. If, in
addition, a child also has bonded with other adult caregivers and it
would be in the child's best interests to reside with those third
parties, custody in third parties is a likely result. In the future,
therefore, courts might advantageously devote more effort to
interpreting and reinforcing the statutory direction provided by the
Minnesota Legislature as to how to determine a child's best
interests.199 Through a thoughtful provision, the legislature
197. See In re B.L.H & D.A.H., No. Co-93-175, 1993 WL 216896, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App.June 22, 1993)
198. Illinois courts, for example, historically evaluate a series of factors, such as
the circumstances under which the third party obtained custody, the duration of
custody, and various potential indicia of parental "consent" to the third party
relationship. See generally Lawrence Schlam, Children "Not in the Physical Custody of
One of [Their] Parents": The SuperiorRights Doctrine and Third Party Standing Under the
Uniform Marriageand Dissolution of MarriageAc 24 S. ILL. U. L. REv. 405 (2000).
199. Minnesota Statutes section 257.025, titled "Custody Disputes," provides:
(a) In any proceeding where two or more parties seek custody of a child
the court shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors in determining
the best interests of the child, including the following factors:
(1) the wishes of the party or parties as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each party and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a party or
parties, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; except
that a disability, as defined in section 363.01, of a proposed custodian or
the child shall not be determinative of the custody of the child, unless
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provided factors by which courts should determine the best
interests of a child "in any proceeding where two or more parties
seek custody of [the] child ....

."m

This provision, enacted four

years after Wallin, does not appear to have been explicitly adopted
in decisions relating to third party custody disputes. At present,
courts seem content to either mention this provision in passing or
not mention it at all.201

In addition, instead of preserving by default previous dicta
indicating the existence of a "two-part" analysis in child custody
determinations, one in which parental "preferences" must be
rebutted before a court can analyze a child's best interests, it should
be made clear that the sole issue is whether the child's best
interests dictate that custody should be with the parent or the nonparent. Factors to consider in this determination should be those
contemplated by section 257.025, including available evidence of
"grave and weighty" reasons "approach [ing] those required for the

the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the
child;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child
in the child's culture, religion, or creed, if any;
(11) the child's cultural background; and
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to
domestic abuse as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred between
the parents or the parties.
The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others. The
court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and explain
how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the
best interests of the child.
(b) The fact that the parents of the child are not or were never married
to each other shall not be determinative of the custody of the child.
(c) The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect the custodian's relationship to the child.
(d) The court shall consider evidence of a violation of section 609.507 in
determining the best interests of the child.
(e) A person may seek custody of a child by filing a petition or motion
pursuant to section 518.156.
(f) Section 518.619 applies to this section.
MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (1998).
200. MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (a).
201. See, e.g., In re T.R.M.G., No. CX-88-489, 1988 WL 88552 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1988) (addressing a third party custody dispute without ever mentioning
Minnesota Statute section 257.025); In re P.L.C. & D.L.C., 384 N.W.2d 222 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (addressing a third party custody dispute after the enactment of
Minnesota Statute section 257.025 and never once mentioning said provision).
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A preliminary focus on the "superior rights" doctrine imposes
what has203been called an "adult-centric" perspective in child custody
matters.
In reinforcing that doctrine, courts inevitably give
undue priority to the constitutional or natural rights of parents,204
instead of children's important interests in maintaining
relationships with adults who provide support, care and nurturing
that parents have refused or been unable to provide. 205 This
depreciates the interests and role of those other adults, who by
reason of consistent nurture and day-to-day care, allowed
themselves to become "psychological" parents. 206 Children develop
207
unique attachments to adults they perceive to be parents; failing
to maintain a child's relationship with "psychological" parents can
2081
be devastating to that child.
Moreover, in pursuing the interests
of children under the automatic assumption that parents should
have superior rights to custody, courts may fail to focus on
establishing useful precedent regarding seemingly more important
questions-what kinds of careaving relationships with children
ought to justify custody and why?

202. T.R.M.G., 1988 WL 88552, at *2.
203. "Law defines parenthood from a curiously adult-centric perspective that
gives little currency to the ability of children to recognize and claim their mothers
and fathers." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parent'sRights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1795 (1993) (discussing the
importance of nurturing parenthood rather than biological parenthood).
204. In practice, the child's best interests are often balanced and made
subordinate to parents' rights. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 54. Property
concepts distort the modem focus on "best interests" in custody determinations as
a result of the preservation of the archaic "superior rights" doctrine in the
UMDA's third party custody standing provision. See, e.g., Eric P. Salthe, Note,
Would Abolishing the NaturalParentPreference in Custody Disputes Be in Everyone's Best
Interest?, 29J. FAM. L. 539, 541 (1990-1991) (referring to preferences for natural
parents as "archaic" and "harmful").
205. "The bias against third party custody.., involves an assumption that the
interests of most children are best served by protecting the rights of their parents.
In some cases, however, if the best interests of children are evaluated
independently, a conflict arises between the rights of parents and the welfare of
their children." MAHONEY, supranote 2, at 140.
206. See O'Keefe, supra note 7, at 1100.
207. See id. at 1101.
208. See id. at 1102.
209. See Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 4 (1997).
Under contemporary approaches to child custody decisionmaking, the
decision of who qualifies as a parent clearly affects the outcome of the
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Stepparents present a unique problem. Undeniably, parents
who maintain relationships with their children and have not
knowingly encouraged relationships with third parties
are
•
.
210 fit and
should enjoy preference in custody determinations.
Yet,
generally the "best interests" of most children will require that
those who have become de facto parents-such as stepparentsshould obtain custody.21' The question of "best interests" in third
party custody disputes, therefore, ideally should involve just one
single balancing test. Courts should evaluate the extent to which a
parent successfully maintains her parental responsibilities as
compared with the extent to which third parties, such as
stepparents, have psychologically bonded with the child after
having 2a significant impact on the life, health and well being of that
child.
application of the best interest of the child standard. Although the
rhetoric remains centered on the child, the focus in child custody
decisionmaking is, in actuality, displaced from the child's best interests to
the parents' rights.
Id.
210. If the parent has maintained regular contact with the child, the chances
of regaining custody are good. See In re Krause, 444 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ill. App.
1982); see also Kaas, supra note 14, at 1117. "The only ground sufficient to
overcome the preference in favor of a capable parent is [, at least in a
reunification case, should be] proof that the change in custody [back to the
parent] will cause the child significant and long-term psychological harm." Id. at
1119. However, "[t ] he closer the bond between the nonparent and the child, the
more likely the court will be to find that a move will cause emotional trauma to the
child." Id. "This emphasis on the impact on the child is not a novel concept.
Justice Joseph Story recognized that the question [is] 'whether [returning the
child to the parent] will be for the real, permanent interests of the infant.'" Id. at
1117 n.376 (citing United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (D. R.I. 1824)).
211. Those cases in which the child is living with a nonparent as a result of the
formation of a second family and the subsequent absence of or abandonment by
the biological parent "is one of the few third party custody cases in which a best
interests approach is constitutionally permissible." Kaas, supra note 14, at 1098.
212. See Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems ParadigmFor Legal Decision Making
Affecting Child Custody, 6 CoRNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 11 (1996). Legislatures
seeking to deter the bringing of frivolous claims by imposing reasonable
requirements which must be met before granting standing to stepparents
implicitly state the contours of a de facto parental relationship, such as that
stepparents have resided with the child for a certain length of time, that they have
assumed partial or primary financial responsibility for the child, that the
relationship began with the consent of the custodial parent, that the child wants to
continue the relationship, and that doing so would not be detrimental to the
child. See Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood:Child Custody and Visitation When
NontraditionalFamilies Dissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 223, 256-57 (1994).
Similarly, courts do the same by granting standing after making findings of in loco
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Many states, of course, have awarded custody to third parties
such as stepparents in the "best interests" of children. 3 As in
Minnesota, several state legislatures have attempted to overcome
the effect of the "superior rights" doctrine either by broadening
the definition of those with standing to petition for custody of
children or broadening the concept of "parent" itself.
Connecticut, for example, now allows any interested third party to
intervene in child custody proceedings.2 14 In a conceptually similar
approach, states such as Oregon define the parental relationship
solely in terms of the nurturing and support an individual has given
the child, 15 which benefit stepparents who have acted in loco
parentis.

parentiswhere the stepparent accepted the child into the household to establish a
relationship, supported the child financially and emotionally, was involved in the
day-to-day care of the child, and intended to establish a parental relationship. See
Levine, supra note 3, at 329-31.
213. See Mangnall, supra note 3, at 419 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 57146(2)(1993)) ("Custody may be awarded to persons other than the mother or
father whenever the award serves the best interest of the child."); see also N.D.
Michigan also gives standing to third parties
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1991)).
and does not require parental unfitness before a claim can be asserted. See MICH.
COMP. LAw §§ 722.21 and 722.25 (West Supp. 1999-2000); Ruppel v. Lesner, 339
N.W.2d 49, 51 (Mich. App. 1983); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(2), 14-10124 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119 (1990); In re Sorenson, 906 P.2d 838, 840
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stepparents and others "who [have] established emotional
ties creating a parent-child relationship with a child" may intervene in divorce
proceedings or otherwise request custody).
214. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-57 (West 2000) (emphasis added); see
also HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1999) (establishing best interests standard for third
party custody cases); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1992 & Supp. 1995) ("An award of custody may be made
to a stepparent if the court determines that such an award is in the best interest of
the child."). These and other states dissatisfied with the parental preference
standard, have made the best interest standard the sole test in all third party
custody disputes. See David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learningfrom Social Sciences: A
Model for Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REv. 49, 56 (1992).
215. SeeOR. REv. STAT § 109.119(4) (1990):
A relationship that exists or did exist... within the six months preceding
the filing of an action.., and in which relationship a person having
physical custody of a child or residing in the same household...
supplied.., food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and
provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline, and
which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, that fulfilled the child's
psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical needs.
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In Buness v. Gillen,116 for example, the Alaska Supreme Court
found that a stepfather developed a strong emotional bond with a
child. He lived with the child's natural mother and although he
never married her, he had been the child's primary caregiver and
"father figure.
Wisconsin courts now simply require that third
parties requesting custody establish, inter alia, a parent-like
relationship. This may be accomplished by showing:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's relationship with the child;
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household;
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood
by taking significant responsibility for the child's care,
education and development, including contributing
towards the child's support, without expectation of
financial compensation; and
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a
length of time sufficient to have established with the child
218
a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.
Wisconsin's approach, however, is problematic. That state's
recent law continues to unduly focus on the "superior rights" of
parents by insisting on parental consent to or fostering of the nonparent's relationship, an often difficult matter of proof. In Ellison
219
v. Ramos, on the other hand, a North Carolina court recently
interpreted that state's third party standing provision as calling for
a simple balancing test. (This might be a point of clarification
useful to the Minnesota Supreme Court.) The North Carolina
statute provides-as does Minnesota's, essentiallyw-that "[a]ny
parent, relative, or other person... claiming the right to custody of
216. 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989).
217. See id. at 989.
218. Beth Neu, Family Law--Visitation-Wisconsin Brings Child Visitation Out of
the Closet By Granting Standing to Nonparents in Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d
419 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 475 (1995), 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 911, 920
(1996)(citing H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995)) (emphasis added).
The second prong, that some triggering event occurred which threatens the
continuation of the parent-like relationship, sets a timetable for the claims of nonparents. See id. at 951. Under this prong, non-parents must make their claims
when the threat occurs or within a reasonable amount of time thereafter. See id.
219. 502 S.E.2d 891 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody
of such child ... 220 In Ellison, therefore, the father's 22former
companion petitioned
for
his diabetic daug
. 'S She
fo custody
cutod of
ofhisdiaetctdaughater.
comanin ptitone

alleged that during her relationship with the father, she, rather
than the father, was responsible for rearing and caring for the
child, that the father wanted to take the child to Puerto Rico to live
with his paternal grandparents, and that those grandparents were
222
incapable of meeting the child's special needs.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court noted that a "broad
grant of standing [does] not convey an absolute right upon every
person who allegedly has an interest in the child to assert
custody. 22' Nevertheless, the goal is to "promote the best interests
of the child in all custody determinations," 224 and "the relationship
between • •-the ,,225third party and the child is the relevant
consideration.
The court found that the third party had
standing to petition because she alleged such a relationship and
then discussed whether she also had stated a claim given the
"constitutionally mandated presumption that, as between a natural
226
parent and a third party, the natural parent should have custody.
Consistent with but more clearly stated than in Minnesota
precedent, the North Carolina court reasoned that:
[T]he parent may no longer enjoy a paramount status if
his or her conduct is inconsistent with this presumption
or if he or she fails to shoulder the responsibilities that are
attendant to rearing a child. [Conduct] inconsistent with
the parent's protected status, which need not rise to the
statutory level warranting termination of parental rights,
would result in application of the "best interest of the
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1999).
221. See Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 893.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 894 (citation omitted).
224. "What is in the best interests of the child is now considered to be the most
important, overriding factor in a court's decision awarding custody." LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 5, at § 2.04, 38 (citations omitted). "In some of
these states, it is said to be the exclusive factor on which a court should base its
custody decisions." Id. (citations omitted).
225. See Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 894. "Accordingly, we hold that a relationship in
the nature of a parent and child relationship, even in the absence of a biological
relationship, will suffice to support a finding of standing." Id.
226. Id. at 896. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized "a fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child...." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/9
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child" test without offending the Due Process Clause. 27
Thus, because a period of voluntary non-parent custody
constituted conduct inconsistent with a parent's protected status
where the parent did not indicate that the period of non-parent
custody was intended to be temporary,
the petition was
sustained.'2
Otherwise, "the action [should be] appropriately
dismissed, as the natural parent presumption [would] defeat the
claim as a matter of law."230 This approach to jurisdiction and
ultimate decisions on the merits presented by Ellison is somewhat
more permissive of third party interests than in Minnesota,
especially those of de facto step-parents, but appears to be an ideal
approach toward protecting parental rights while focusing on the
ultimate best interests of children.
VIII. CONCLUSION

To some extent, courts faced with determining the proper role
of parental preferences in custody determinations inevitably will
anticipate and accomplish children's "best interests" by contorting
legal reasoning and straining to fit available facts into quasiproperty notions of proper relinquishment of parental rights. 231
These efforts, of course, involve considerations unrelated to
children's "best interests ",2

2

and create the unfortunate irony of a

state purporting to act in the best interests of children in custody
determinations, while in fact focusing more immediately on
protecting the quasi-property rights of parents. Moreover, this
227. Ellison, 502 S.W.2d at 896. The due process clause is not offended by the
application of the best interest test to recognize a family already in existence. See
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
228. See Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 897 (citing Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 53637 (N.C. 1997)).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See supraPart IV.F.
232. The continuing use of presumptions favoring parents indicates that third
party custody decisions are not so much based on the best interests of the child as
they are on claims to the ownership of property. See Erin E. Wynne, Children's
Rights and the Biological Bias: A Comparison Between the United States and Canada in
BiologicalParent Versus Third-Party Custody Disputes, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 367, 381-82

(1996).
233. "Patriarchal notions of ownership do not lend themselves to a childcentered theory of custody or parenthood. The patriarchal tradition assumes that
parent's rights exist for the parent and not.., for the child." Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
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approach often tends not to illuminate the proper relationship
between parents' "superior rights" and the "best interests" of
children.
Minnesota child custody provisions tend to minimize these
problems. Still, legislative efforts may be required, especially where
the rights •of stepparents
who may not currently be in residence
.234 .
with their stepchildren are concerned. Minnesota lawmakers also
might consider further amending the state's custody provisions to
more clearly establish a single "best interests" analysis, one that, as
in Ellison, simply balances evidence of parental responsibility or
irresponsibility against third party claims of consensual
psychological bonding. Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court
might profitably encourage the judiciary to articulate the factors in
Minnesota Statute section 257.025, which favor or disfavor parents
and third parties in third party custody disputes. Such
modifications might allow greater flexibility in protecting the best
interests of children and encourage greater focus on the nature of
de facto parent-child relationships that properly militate in favor of
custody in third parties.

WM.& MARYL. REv. 995, 1114 (1992).

234. "The incoherent pattern of outcomes and the murky and inconsistent
discussions of the governing rules almost certainly reflect our society's conflicting
and unresolved attitudes about stepparents, even when loving, and about biologic
parents, even when indifferent." David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents,
and the Law's Perception of "Family" After Divorce, in DIvORcE REFORM AT THE
CRossRoADs 122 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
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